PublicationsHere, you can find some of my papers.
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Research Articles
Hume's Social Epistemology and the Dialogue Form
Episteme, Forthcoming
Abstract: Hume begins his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion by providing a discussion on what an ideal dialogue ought to look like. Many considerations that Hume raises coincide with similar concerns in contemporary social epistemology. This paper examines three aspects of Hume’s social epistemology: epistemic peerhood, inquiry norms and the possibility of rational persuasion. Interestingly, however, I will argue that the conversation between Philo, Cleanthes and Demea falls short of meeting Hume’s articulated standard of what an ideal dialogue ought to look like. From this analysis, I defend the less popular view that Demea’s decision to leave the conversation (in Part XI) was entirely reasonable and suggest an explanation for why Hume decided to make Cleanthes the ‘hero’ of the Dialogues.
Teaching & Learning Guide for: Theistic Arguments from Horrendous Evils
Philosophy Compass, 2023
Abstract: Teaching and Learning Guide to incorporate paper on 'Theistic Arguments from Horrendous Evils' into syllabus.
Wang Yangming on ‘Unquestioning Obedience’ and Epistemic Superiority
Philosophy East and West, 2023
Abstract: Within various contexts, such as politics and parenting, Confucianism has been criticized on the basis that it endorses ‘unquestioning obedience’ to authorities. In recent years, several philosophers have argued against this view by appealing to textual evidence from Classical Confucian philosophers. In this essay, I examine Wang Yangming’s views on this subject, arguing that Wang teaches that criticism of those who stand in a socially superior role relation is not only permitted, but encouraged. From this, I consider the implications that Wang’s analysis has for contemporary discussions of disagreement between epistemic superiors and inferiors and epistemic peerhood. I will argue that Wang’s position is much closer to the total evidence view than the preemptive view. Relatedly, I will suggest that Wang provides a novel proposal about how to recognise or disregard epistemic ‘superiors’, especially in the context of moral knowledge.
A Mencian Account of Resentment
Philosophy Compass, 2022
Abstract: The reactive attitude of ‘resentment’ has been gaining increasing attention within contemporary philosophical literature. However, little attention has been given to the conceptions of resentment in Asian philosophy. In recent years, some philosophers have argued that there is a positive account of resentment in Confucian philosophy. This paper brings a recent Mencian account of resentment in conversation with contemporary philosophical discussions. The conversations revolve around aspects of resentment such as exculpatory conditions, payback, transition, and moral cultivation. The conversation not only adds clarity to the Mencian account, it also demonstrates potential contributions this account has to contemporary discussions on resentment.
Theistic Arguments from Horrendous Evils
Philosophy Compass, 2022
Abstract: While the existence of horrendous evils has generally been taken to be evidence against the existence of God, some philosophers have suggested that it may be evidence for the existence of God. This paper introduces three main kinds of theistic arguments from horrendous evils: the argument from objectively horrifying evils, the pragmatic argument from evil, and an argument from reasonable responses. For each of these arguments, I will first reconstruct a standard version of the argument, before suggesting ways the argument may be challenged, or further developed.
Worldview Disagreement and Subjective Epistemic Obligations
Synthese, 2022
Abstract: In this paper, I provide an account of subjective epistemic obligations. In instances of peer disagreement, one possesses at least two types of obligations: objective epistemic obligations and subjective epistemic obligations. While objective epistemic obligations, such as conciliationism and remaining steadfast, have been much discussed in the literature, subjective epistemic obligations have received little attention. I develop an account of subjective epistemic obligations in the context of worldview disagreements. In recent literature, the notion of worldview disagreement has been receiving increasing attention (e.g., Lougheed 2020, Ranalli 2020, Lougheed 2021), and I discuss how understanding worldview disagreements through different classes of beliefs might clarify our understanding of subjective epistemic obligations. I first distinguish between three classes of beliefs, by virtue of their justificatory functions within worldviews: fundamental, crucial and incidental. I then discuss four kinds of worldview disagreements based on this account. Finally, I argue that each disagreement results in different subjective epistemic obligations for each disputant. I conclude by discussing some implications this analysis has for issues such as defeat, peerhood, and epistemic injustice.
Theodicy on Trial
Philosophia, 2022
Abstract: Moral anti-theodicists have posed a consequentialist argument against the theodical enterprise: that theodicies lead to harmful consequences in reality and that this should be sufficient reason to motivate abandoning the practise of theodicising altogether. In this paper, I examine variants of this argument and discuss several prominent responses from theodicists, including the separation thesis. I argue that while these responses are effective in resisting the global conclusion by the anti-theodicist, it still leaves the theodical enterprise vulnerable to a weaker version of the consequentialist critique. In response, I develop an account of ‘theodicies-of-embrace-protest’ which is able to preserve the meaningful strides made in traditional theodicies while taking seriously the criticisms of the moral anti-theodicists.
Hume's Fragment on Evil
Hume Studies (Accepted, Forthcoming)
Abstract: Since its relatively recent publication (1995), Hume’s Fragment on Evil has received little sustained analysis. References to the Fragment tend to be scarce, and at best, only parts of the Fragment are cited at any time. This essay presents an interpretation of the Fragment that considers the text in its entirety, emphasizing its overall argumentative features and structure. This essay begins by providing an introduction to the background of the Fragment, arguing that Hume was likely responding, in part, to Butler’s Analogy. It then examines the aims and methodology of the Fragment. In this, it considers Hume’s naturalistic and experimental epistemology and his mitigated scepticism. The Fragment is presented as a discussion about our ability to know the moral attributes of God. The rest of the essay discusses the three strategies Hume employs to answer this question. Further, it considers Hume’s own distinction between a philosophical response to the question (its foundation in reason) and a psychological one (its origin in human nature). Throughout the essay, I provide an evaluation of Hume’s key arguments and point out several connections the Fragment has with other texts in Hume’s corpus. I conclude by suggesting that these connections indicate that the Fragment represent Hume’s own views.
Evidentialism, Stubborn Counterevidence and Horrendous Evils
Australasian Philosophical Review, 2022
Abstract: Dormandy argues that stubborn counterevidence provides a reason for Evidentialists to form negative beliefs about God. Focusing on ‘horrendous evils’ as a kind of stubborn counterevidence, I discuss two possible interpretations of Dormandy’s account (a stronger and a weaker view). Against the stronger view, I consider the case of a Committed Theistic Evidentialist, that is, an evidentialist who possesses a defeater belief against horrendous evils. I argue that it would be improbable that she would form negative beliefs about God on the basis of horrendous evils alone. I consider the response of a Committed Theistic Evidentialist towards horrendous evils, arguing that for her, ‘honesty’, which results in a psychological struggle, is an excellent-making property of her faith.
Hume's Rhetorical Strategy
Journal of Scottish Philosophy, 2021
Abstract: In the Fragment on Evil, Hume announces that he “shall not employ any rhetoric in a philosophical argument, where reason alone ought to be hearkened to.” To employ the rhetorical strategy, in the context of the Fragment, just is to “enumerate all the evils, incident to human life, and display them, with eloquence, in their proper colours.” However, in Part 11 of the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Hume employs precisely this rhetorical strategy. I discuss three interpretations that might account for Hume’s decision to employ the strategy in the Dialogues but not the Fragment. The heart of this discussion concerns the relationship between reason and rhetoric. The Dialogues can be understood as part of the education of Pamphilus. Consequently, the three interpretations align with three ways of understanding the roles that reason and rhetoric play in Hume’s views on pedagogy and education (or more specifically, Philo’s attitude towards the education of Pamphilus).
Episteme, Forthcoming
Abstract: Hume begins his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion by providing a discussion on what an ideal dialogue ought to look like. Many considerations that Hume raises coincide with similar concerns in contemporary social epistemology. This paper examines three aspects of Hume’s social epistemology: epistemic peerhood, inquiry norms and the possibility of rational persuasion. Interestingly, however, I will argue that the conversation between Philo, Cleanthes and Demea falls short of meeting Hume’s articulated standard of what an ideal dialogue ought to look like. From this analysis, I defend the less popular view that Demea’s decision to leave the conversation (in Part XI) was entirely reasonable and suggest an explanation for why Hume decided to make Cleanthes the ‘hero’ of the Dialogues.
Teaching & Learning Guide for: Theistic Arguments from Horrendous Evils
Philosophy Compass, 2023
Abstract: Teaching and Learning Guide to incorporate paper on 'Theistic Arguments from Horrendous Evils' into syllabus.
Wang Yangming on ‘Unquestioning Obedience’ and Epistemic Superiority
Philosophy East and West, 2023
Abstract: Within various contexts, such as politics and parenting, Confucianism has been criticized on the basis that it endorses ‘unquestioning obedience’ to authorities. In recent years, several philosophers have argued against this view by appealing to textual evidence from Classical Confucian philosophers. In this essay, I examine Wang Yangming’s views on this subject, arguing that Wang teaches that criticism of those who stand in a socially superior role relation is not only permitted, but encouraged. From this, I consider the implications that Wang’s analysis has for contemporary discussions of disagreement between epistemic superiors and inferiors and epistemic peerhood. I will argue that Wang’s position is much closer to the total evidence view than the preemptive view. Relatedly, I will suggest that Wang provides a novel proposal about how to recognise or disregard epistemic ‘superiors’, especially in the context of moral knowledge.
A Mencian Account of Resentment
Philosophy Compass, 2022
Abstract: The reactive attitude of ‘resentment’ has been gaining increasing attention within contemporary philosophical literature. However, little attention has been given to the conceptions of resentment in Asian philosophy. In recent years, some philosophers have argued that there is a positive account of resentment in Confucian philosophy. This paper brings a recent Mencian account of resentment in conversation with contemporary philosophical discussions. The conversations revolve around aspects of resentment such as exculpatory conditions, payback, transition, and moral cultivation. The conversation not only adds clarity to the Mencian account, it also demonstrates potential contributions this account has to contemporary discussions on resentment.
Theistic Arguments from Horrendous Evils
Philosophy Compass, 2022
Abstract: While the existence of horrendous evils has generally been taken to be evidence against the existence of God, some philosophers have suggested that it may be evidence for the existence of God. This paper introduces three main kinds of theistic arguments from horrendous evils: the argument from objectively horrifying evils, the pragmatic argument from evil, and an argument from reasonable responses. For each of these arguments, I will first reconstruct a standard version of the argument, before suggesting ways the argument may be challenged, or further developed.
Worldview Disagreement and Subjective Epistemic Obligations
Synthese, 2022
Abstract: In this paper, I provide an account of subjective epistemic obligations. In instances of peer disagreement, one possesses at least two types of obligations: objective epistemic obligations and subjective epistemic obligations. While objective epistemic obligations, such as conciliationism and remaining steadfast, have been much discussed in the literature, subjective epistemic obligations have received little attention. I develop an account of subjective epistemic obligations in the context of worldview disagreements. In recent literature, the notion of worldview disagreement has been receiving increasing attention (e.g., Lougheed 2020, Ranalli 2020, Lougheed 2021), and I discuss how understanding worldview disagreements through different classes of beliefs might clarify our understanding of subjective epistemic obligations. I first distinguish between three classes of beliefs, by virtue of their justificatory functions within worldviews: fundamental, crucial and incidental. I then discuss four kinds of worldview disagreements based on this account. Finally, I argue that each disagreement results in different subjective epistemic obligations for each disputant. I conclude by discussing some implications this analysis has for issues such as defeat, peerhood, and epistemic injustice.
Theodicy on Trial
Philosophia, 2022
Abstract: Moral anti-theodicists have posed a consequentialist argument against the theodical enterprise: that theodicies lead to harmful consequences in reality and that this should be sufficient reason to motivate abandoning the practise of theodicising altogether. In this paper, I examine variants of this argument and discuss several prominent responses from theodicists, including the separation thesis. I argue that while these responses are effective in resisting the global conclusion by the anti-theodicist, it still leaves the theodical enterprise vulnerable to a weaker version of the consequentialist critique. In response, I develop an account of ‘theodicies-of-embrace-protest’ which is able to preserve the meaningful strides made in traditional theodicies while taking seriously the criticisms of the moral anti-theodicists.
Hume's Fragment on Evil
Hume Studies (Accepted, Forthcoming)
Abstract: Since its relatively recent publication (1995), Hume’s Fragment on Evil has received little sustained analysis. References to the Fragment tend to be scarce, and at best, only parts of the Fragment are cited at any time. This essay presents an interpretation of the Fragment that considers the text in its entirety, emphasizing its overall argumentative features and structure. This essay begins by providing an introduction to the background of the Fragment, arguing that Hume was likely responding, in part, to Butler’s Analogy. It then examines the aims and methodology of the Fragment. In this, it considers Hume’s naturalistic and experimental epistemology and his mitigated scepticism. The Fragment is presented as a discussion about our ability to know the moral attributes of God. The rest of the essay discusses the three strategies Hume employs to answer this question. Further, it considers Hume’s own distinction between a philosophical response to the question (its foundation in reason) and a psychological one (its origin in human nature). Throughout the essay, I provide an evaluation of Hume’s key arguments and point out several connections the Fragment has with other texts in Hume’s corpus. I conclude by suggesting that these connections indicate that the Fragment represent Hume’s own views.
Evidentialism, Stubborn Counterevidence and Horrendous Evils
Australasian Philosophical Review, 2022
Abstract: Dormandy argues that stubborn counterevidence provides a reason for Evidentialists to form negative beliefs about God. Focusing on ‘horrendous evils’ as a kind of stubborn counterevidence, I discuss two possible interpretations of Dormandy’s account (a stronger and a weaker view). Against the stronger view, I consider the case of a Committed Theistic Evidentialist, that is, an evidentialist who possesses a defeater belief against horrendous evils. I argue that it would be improbable that she would form negative beliefs about God on the basis of horrendous evils alone. I consider the response of a Committed Theistic Evidentialist towards horrendous evils, arguing that for her, ‘honesty’, which results in a psychological struggle, is an excellent-making property of her faith.
Hume's Rhetorical Strategy
Journal of Scottish Philosophy, 2021
Abstract: In the Fragment on Evil, Hume announces that he “shall not employ any rhetoric in a philosophical argument, where reason alone ought to be hearkened to.” To employ the rhetorical strategy, in the context of the Fragment, just is to “enumerate all the evils, incident to human life, and display them, with eloquence, in their proper colours.” However, in Part 11 of the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Hume employs precisely this rhetorical strategy. I discuss three interpretations that might account for Hume’s decision to employ the strategy in the Dialogues but not the Fragment. The heart of this discussion concerns the relationship between reason and rhetoric. The Dialogues can be understood as part of the education of Pamphilus. Consequently, the three interpretations align with three ways of understanding the roles that reason and rhetoric play in Hume’s views on pedagogy and education (or more specifically, Philo’s attitude towards the education of Pamphilus).
Resenting Heaven in the Mencius: An Extended Footnote to Mencius 2B13
Dao, 2021
Abstract: It is widely accepted among Mencius scholars that for Mencius, the junzi 君子 is the kind of person who accepts Heaven’s will and never resents Heaven. There are, however, several passages where resentment seems to be presented as a quality that the junzi possesses. In particular, Mencius 2B13 has been the subject of much contention. In Section 1, I will discuss various interpretations of 2B13, building on and updating Philip Ivanhoe’s helpful 1988 survey. In Section 2, I will present an argument for resentment against Heaven in the Mencius. I argue from passages in the Mencius and its relationship with the Shijing 詩經 (Book of Odes) that we have good reason to think that, under certain circumstances, the junzi ought to resent Heaven. In Section 3, I will develop a theory of resentment from the Mencius and demonstrate how 2B13 can be understood in the larger context of this theory.
[Click here to read paper online]
Dao, 2021
Abstract: It is widely accepted among Mencius scholars that for Mencius, the junzi 君子 is the kind of person who accepts Heaven’s will and never resents Heaven. There are, however, several passages where resentment seems to be presented as a quality that the junzi possesses. In particular, Mencius 2B13 has been the subject of much contention. In Section 1, I will discuss various interpretations of 2B13, building on and updating Philip Ivanhoe’s helpful 1988 survey. In Section 2, I will present an argument for resentment against Heaven in the Mencius. I argue from passages in the Mencius and its relationship with the Shijing 詩經 (Book of Odes) that we have good reason to think that, under certain circumstances, the junzi ought to resent Heaven. In Section 3, I will develop a theory of resentment from the Mencius and demonstrate how 2B13 can be understood in the larger context of this theory.
[Click here to read paper online]
Book Chapters
A Nudge and a Poké: Pokémon GO and the Ethics of Nudging
Pokémon and Philosophy, Carus Books (ed. N. Michaud), forthcoming
Abstract: Pokémon GO has been one of the most successful and impactful mobile games in history. Part of the reason for its success is due to its ability to appeal to various aspects of player experience. This chapter examines how the designers of the game employ a behavioral strategy popularly known as ‘nudging’ in order to promote two goals: socialisation and monetisation. We then consider the ethics of nudging as it is employed by Pokémon GO.
Reports
Country Report: The Teaching of Philosophy in Singapore Schools (Part 2)
Journal of Didactics of Philosophy, 2021
Abstract: This country report provides an update on the status of Pre-University Philosophy education in Singapore.
[Click here to read article]
Other Writings
Seinfeld, Friends and the Moral Permissibility of Lying
Blog of the APA (teaching and learning video series), 2021
[Click here to read blog post]
A Nudge and a Poké: Pokémon GO and the Ethics of Nudging
Pokémon and Philosophy, Carus Books (ed. N. Michaud), forthcoming
Abstract: Pokémon GO has been one of the most successful and impactful mobile games in history. Part of the reason for its success is due to its ability to appeal to various aspects of player experience. This chapter examines how the designers of the game employ a behavioral strategy popularly known as ‘nudging’ in order to promote two goals: socialisation and monetisation. We then consider the ethics of nudging as it is employed by Pokémon GO.
Reports
Country Report: The Teaching of Philosophy in Singapore Schools (Part 2)
Journal of Didactics of Philosophy, 2021
Abstract: This country report provides an update on the status of Pre-University Philosophy education in Singapore.
[Click here to read article]
Other Writings
Seinfeld, Friends and the Moral Permissibility of Lying
Blog of the APA (teaching and learning video series), 2021
[Click here to read blog post]